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ARGUMENT
I. THE TAX COMMISSION'S STATED STANDARD OF REVIEW IS IN
ERROR.
The Tax Commission argues that this Court should grant considerable deferance to the
findings of the Tax Commission in this case under the holdings in Morton International. Inc. v.
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) and Boyd v.
Department of Employment Security. 773 P.2d 398 (Utah App. 1989).
The problem with the Tax Commission's argument is that the issues being appealed in
this case have nothing to do with tax law. As set forth in Morton, it is only when the agency is
acting within its area of expertise that the courts should grant the deferential standard of review.
Morton at 585; see also Boyd at 400.
The issues before this Court are purely issues of statutory interpretation combined with a
determination of the reasonableness of dismissing an individual's appeal based upon his failure
to attend a status conference of which he received no notice.
Appellant believes the correct standard of review is that set forth within Appellant's
Brief.
II. ARCO DID NOT RECEIVE NOTICE AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE OR
CONSTITUTION.
The Tax Commission begins the argument in this Brief by stating "When the
Commission mailed the notice to the Petitioner's last known address and to the Petitioner's
counsel, the Commission fulfilled requirements of proper notification." Respondent's Brief,
Page 12.

The problem with this statement is that it is not true.
From the time the audit was originally performed to the present, the Petitioner's address
has never changed. In its Order of Dismissal of Appeal #93-0337 the Tax Commission had no
problem in getting the correct address for the Petitioner. Yet this document was filed over a year
before the Notice of Status Conference.
If under the Tax Commission's own reasoning, the Order had to be mailed to Petitioner's
counsel and to Petitioner's last known address, the Tax Commission has failed to meet that
burden, and the Order of Dismissal should be reversed.
A. The "Reasonableness" Of Sending Notice To Arco's Counsel Is Irrelevant.
Under Section IA of the Tax Commission's Brief, they argue that the Commission had
been sending correspondence only to Petitioner's counsel since 1993. That simply is not true.
That is amply demonstrated by Addendum "D" which is attached to Appellant's Brief. Exhibit
"D" also begs the question on why the Tax Commission continued to use the 660 South address
for the Petitioner when it knew that that address was not a good one. There is no record that at
any time the Tax Commission ever requested a different address from Petitioner's counsel, nor is
there any evidence as to why they did not continue to use the address of Dee Clark, whom the
Tax Commission knew was the principal for Arco Electric. See Addendum D. To Appelant's
Brief.
The test for adequate notice set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) was that notice should comply with the
requirements of practicability and must be reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.

2

Mullane at 318. It is undeniable that the Tax Commission had the information in their
possession as to Arco Electric's actual address, and yet were unwilling to use it. Surely under no
circumstance would notice be deemed adequate if a party knowing the actual address and
location of a party intentionally mailed the information to another address where they knew they
were not.
The more fundamental flaw in the Tax Commission's argument however, is that it
focuses on the issue of whether it was proper to mail Notice of the Status Conference to Arco's
counsel. That is not the question that is being asked. The question that is being asked by this
appeal is whether it is proper to dismiss the Petition of a party where no one actually receives
notice that the hearing is going to take place. Arco is not arguing that the Tax Commission is
obligated to determine whether or not notice has been received. Arco is merely stating that when
the evidence is presented that shows that notice was not received that a taxpayer's Petition
should not be dismissed.
B. Actual Receipt Is Required Before Dismissal Is a Proper Remedy.
The Tax Commission does not deny that the plain language of Utah Code Annotated,
§63-46b-l l(l)(b) requires actual receipt of notice prior to the entering of a default against a
participant in a formal adjudicated proceeding. Instead, the Tax Commission argues the general
proposition of statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted as a whole. While the Tax
Commission failed to cite a single Utah citation in support of that proposition, Arco Electric has
no problem with that general rule of statutory construction. Arco's problem is in seeing how that
rule impacts this case.
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The Tax Commission failed to show how the plain language of U.C.A. §63-46b-l 1 would
be interpreted differently if you look at the statute as a whole. The one case cited by the Tax
Commission, in terms of this general proposition, was Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), the case does not support the Tax
Commission's position. In its brief, the Tax Commission admitted that the holding in that case
was "the plain language of the statute prevails unless it makes the statute inoperative".
Respondent's Brief, Page 17. Nothing in the plain language of U.C.A. §63-46b-l 1(1) makes any
other provision in the act inoperative. Therefore, the plain language of the statute must govern.
Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. at 1020.
The Tax Commission seems to imply there is some sort of conflict between U.C.A. §6346b-3(2)(b)(i) and U.C.A. §63-46b-l 1(1), that is just not true. U.C.A. §63-46b-3 sets forth the
requirements for commencing an adjudicative proceeding. U.C.A. §63-46b-l 1 sets forth the
requirements for a default. There is no reason why the requirements for beginning a proceeding
are the same as those required for defaulting a party already participating in the proceeding.
Instead of disproving the taxpayer's position, this in fact, strengthens it. The legislature
uses the terms that it does advisedly and it is important to give effect to the plain meaning of the
words within the context of the statute where they are written. Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905
P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, where there is no evidence of actual receipt the
dismissal must be overturned.
The Tax Commission is unable to show how it will be prejudiced in any fashion in this
case through a reversal of its Order of Dismissal. The taxpayer however, will suffer serious harm
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in that it will be denied its constitutional right to have its claims heard in the courts of this state.
Weighing this case on the law and in equity, the Tax Commission's order of dismissal must be
\ united.

III. THE TAX COMMISSION'S DISMISSAL OF ARCO'S PETITION WAS
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL-

property right which the State is attempting to take through a dismissal of Arco's Petition in this
case. Instead, the Tax -Commission seeks to bend the argument back to the issue of notice. I hat
uigun

'

--riief if>nu IK At :-r.r\r^- :*-J — \opellant's Brief and in Paragraph I

above. The s> - ;:: : 1 1 I portion of .Arco's argument, relating to the unconstitutionality of the
dismissal of its Appeal relates to the fact "'that dismiss

- ,

ma.. . viivuunnu

conference is not allowed by statute. In Arco's initial brief, Arco demonstrates that default is
only authorized for failure to attend a hearing, not for a conference. Arco further demonstrates

and a hearing.
The Tax Commission's sole response is that this Court should be guided by . ^
C irnmission rsally meant, not what it said. The Tax Commission argues that a conference really
should be a hearing, even though their own rules say differently. See Rule 861-1A-1 (A)(7) and
R8o
Again, the Tax Commission seeks to have the Court ignore the well established rules of
statutory construction and to ignore the plain language of the statutes and rales which govern the
Commission's actions

I he Tax Com mission's argi unent that when they said this is a status
5

conference, they really meant that it was to be a formal adjudicative hearing subject to the default
provisions is further evidence of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Tax Commission in
this case.
If a taxpayer cannot rely upon the plain language used, but instead must be forced
through some crystal ball to try to discern what the Tax Commission really means when it says
something else, a taxpayer is left with nothing but confusion and a complete inability to obey the
law.
If the legislature, or the Commission itself for that matter, wished to provide for a status
hearing, they could have done so. If they wish to provide that a party could be defaulted for
failing to attend a status conference they could have done so. They did neither. Accordingly, the
decision by the Tax Commission to dismiss Arco's appeal is a violation of Arco's rights, is
arbitrary and capricious and should be overturned.
A. The Tax Commission's Argument That Petitioner Has Failed To Marshall Its
Evidence Is Disingenuous.
In the final point of its argument, the Tax Commission argues that "Petitioner has failed
to Marshall evidence that the Commission misused or exceeded its discretion." Respondent's
Brief, Page 22. That simply is not true. It is ironic perhaps, that although the Tax Commission
spends a great deal of time claiming that the record does not support the allegations contained in
Arco's Brief with respect to the actions of the Tax Commission, the Tax Commission does not
deny any of them. It is also ironic that the Tax Commission is claiming that the record in this
case is incomplete where it is the Tax Commission that has split Arco's Petition into two
separate appeals and where it was the Tax Commission that failed to designate the record of the
6
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other r .<i ats whict

- - for that very reason that Arco garnered some of those
:essary for this appeal and included them in the Addendum to its original

Brief.
The Tax Commission's arguments that there is a lack of direct testimony on the point of
Petitioner's counsel not receiving notice is absurd. Of course there was no testimony, the fax
^ "> - * i ssion itself denies an opportunity to
_-._ ate a recor
'i

-.; i a Petitioner be held accountable for the la* K ot there being one?
. ,... representations of the I ax. Commission, ^ :c, •.:

i- • *evei , cciiu:..•

statement tu mc cuc^i mat Petitioner's counsel never received notice of the hearing. That
evidence is found at R.11.
^ din

s

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Those cases are irrelevant. This case is not involving a default
judgment or a motion to modify an order under Rule 60. This case has been directly appealed
dismiss, made by the Tax Commission.1
^ tion that negligence by Petitioner's counsel is no excuse under Rule 60,
thisargui-u-

»

Motion, secondly, there has been no showing of any negligence on the part of Petitioner's
counsel. Petitioner's counsel did not receive notice of the hearing. As soon as he received notice
* f'nl;»f* *: >r »nH tfiP i i^aring, he took what steps were allowed to try to remedy the

1

The Tax Commission's claim that Arco has failed to show its entitlement to relief is
-—'ly not true. The issues in the underlying appeal are shown in Appellant's Brief on pp. 17"liere has not however been any ruling on those issues and they are not before the rv *
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situation. To uphold the circular logic proposed by the Tax Commission would be to allow the
Tax Commission to default anybody at any time whom they decided they did not like or did not
wish to listen to or whom they felt might cost the State too much money.
They need merely to send a notice to the wrong address or the wrong party or to have
claimed to send a notice and failed to do so, and then refuse to hear the matter. They can then
turn around and blame it on the Petitioner's attorney and wash their hands of the entire matter.
The perils in such a ruling are obvious.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission seeks to ask this Court to ignore the plain language of the statutes
and its own rules. Instead it asked the Court to uphold its decision because it has absolute
discretion to do anything that it chooses to do. This country does not operate under this
autocratic form of government. One of the very reasons we have rules and statutes is to protect
the rights of the country's citizenry. If the rules and statutes don't meet the goals of the Tax
Commission then they should seek through proper processes to change those rules and
legislation. They cannot simply act in contravention and ask this Court to uphold their decision.
Petitioner therefore respectfully requests this Court reverse the Order of Dismissal
entered in this matter in order to proceed forthwith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of September, 1997.

LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER

Shawn D. Turner
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